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MANAGEMENT SUMMARY
Management summary 
Interdependencies in the field of food, agriculture, and raw materials are growing. 
Global population growth, rising prosperity, and changing consumption patterns 
in emerging economies have increased the demand for all three. Geopolitical 
trends shape global markets for food, agriculture, and raw materials and carry 
consequences for the Dutch agro-food sector. Critical sectors of the Dutch 
agricultural complex are dependent on imported raw materials from the rest  
of the world and are therefore vulnerable to supply disruptions resulting from 
geopolitical developments. This report explores how the Dutch government  
could strengthen the resilience of the Dutch agro-food system and mitigate risks 
to the supply of critical raw material imports.
The emerging geopolitics of food
Food has increasingly become a matter of geopolitics. A growing and 
ever-wealthier world population, increased biofuel use, and a slowdown of 
agricultural productivity growth have prompted a tightening of the global food 
market. In this market setting, harvest failures and policy responses contribute 
to soaring food prices and increased price volatility. Today’s global food security 
challenge differs from the past. The international system is in transition to a 
multipolar world, in which multiple centers of power compete with each other. 
In a multipolar world, the international system is characterized by high 
uncertainty and a higher chance of international tensions. Concurrently, there 
is a resurgence of resource nationalism in some countries, which means the state 
is playing a more pronounced role in the support, ownership and management 
of businesses and strategic industries, such as agriculture and mining.  
Implications for the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, food insecurity is not an imminent risk and the Dutch  
agro-food sector is well integrated in the world market. Nonetheless, geopolitical 
risks are real. Therefore, scenarios under which the Dutch agro-food sector has 
difficulty in adequately sourcing raw material imports, either through open 
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markets, commodities exchanges or business-to-business contracts, should not be 
neglected. Should the supply of critical materials to the Netherlands collapse, the 
Dutch agro-food sector and thereby the overall Dutch economy stand to suffer. 
Addressing this challenge requires a strategic reorientation of the Dutch policy  
on food, agriculture, and raw materials and the role of the government therein. 
Perspectives for action
The Dutch government wants to take care of the interests of Dutch consumers  
and producers of agro-food products while simultaneously supporting a safe and 
stable world characterized by fair international relationships. Therefore, the 
government should find ways that mitigate supply risks that go beyond simply 
achieving the largest supply security at the lowest cost. The Dutch government 
should distance itself from resource nationalism and aggressive overseas policies 
to secure food and raw materials, which sometimes hurt the local economy or local 
food security. The Netherlands can set itself apart by avoiding to shift the burden 
of securing the interests of the Dutch agro-food sector on to developing countries 
and by instead focusing on cooperative solutions aimed at creating long-term win-
win situations that benefit both the Netherlands and the sourcing countries. From 
this perspective, in which reciprocity is key, a number of policy recommendations 
can be formulated. 
Policy recommendations
1  Maintain domestic food production to sustain knowledge and innovation 
base
Sustaining a degree of food self-sufficiency can not only serve as a cushion 
against interruptions of food supply, but is also necessary to maintain an 
advanced agricultural knowledge system and to remain innovative in the field  
of agro-food. Knowledge and innovation are increasingly a source of export 
revenue for the Netherlands and lie at the basis of the competitive position of 
the Dutch agro-food sector abroad. 
2  Focus on top sourcing countries of critical raw materials and explore new 
sourcing opportunities
Critical materials for the Dutch agro-food sector include fruit, nuts, spices, 
coffee, tea, cocoa, margarine, fats, oils, nitrogen, potassium, phosphate, coarse 
grains, soy protein, and other feedstock. The Dutch government should focus on 
extending partnerships with established and new suppliers of these materials. 
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3  Reinvent multilateral cooperation and move beyond promoting open 
markets
While continuing to promote open and stable markets in international forums 
such as the World Trade Organization, the Dutch government should push for 
a critical review of trade legislation, an imposed limitation on the use of export 
restrictions, more transparency in markets, and more cooperation between 
import-dependent countries.
4 Complement multilateral efforts with strategic partnerships 
Develop strategic partnerships with countries where both the Dutch agro-food 
complex has valuable knowledge to offer and from which the Netherlands 
imports critical materials. Partnerships should revolve around innovation for 
sustainable production in the agro-food sector and be based on creating long-
term win-win situations for both the Netherlands and the sourcing country. 
5  Adopt a strategic perspective on sustainability 
Move beyond environmental motives to encourage sustainability and adopt  
a strategic vision on sustainability as means to mitigate supply disruption 
risks for the agro-food sector. Resource efficiency and sustainable supply 
chains avoid rapid resource depletion and create long term supply security. 
Sustainability should be used as a trigger for cooperation with top sourcing 
countries and involvement of the private sector.
6 Start strategic dialogue with the agro-food sector 
Devise strategies to shorten the response time of industry and to limit short-
term economic damage in case of supply disruptions.  Think about ways to 
improve the resilience of industry, including preventive and non-market 
conform strategies. Consider trade-offs between price and supply security.
7 Integrate agro-food interests in economic diplomacy 
Promote an interdepartmental and cross-sectoral dialogue with other 
ministries for a strategic reorientation of international (development) 
cooperation, shifting away from idealistic motives toward an emphasis  
on investment for mutual benefit. Develop a more systematic approach to  
identify which countries should be designated for international cooperation 
and include top sourcing countries for the Dutch agro-food sector. 
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Introduction
Global population growth, rising prosperity and changing consumption patterns 
in emerging economies have increased the demand for food. In addition, slow 
productivity growth, failed harvests and extreme weather conditions have 
hampered supply. As a consequence, the global food market has become 
increasingly tight and food prices have reached record heights over the past 
years. Price spikes of staple foods have contributed to social unrest and political 
instability in various parts of the world. In North Africa, high food prices 
contributed to the ‘Arab Spring’ that resulted in the collapse of various autocratic 
regimes. It has also triggered an increase of land grabbing, i.e. large scale 
acquisitions of farmland by foreign investors, especially in Africa, with potential 
negative consequences for local farmers and global food security. In this context, 
countries are increasingly concerned with food security and formulate policies 
aimed at securing resources that are necessary for agriculture and food 
production. The food, agriculture and raw materials nexus is growing, as 
population growth, rising prosperity and changing consumption patterns will 
increase the demand for all three. This means that tackling problems pertaining 
to one resource will be linked to the demand and supply of others.1 As a 
consequence, strategic thinking about interdependencies in the field of food, 
agriculture and raw materials has become paramount. 
The challenge facing the Netherlands
The changing international playing field forces the Dutch government to think 
more strategically about the strengths and weaknesses of the Dutch agro-food 
sector. The Dutch agro-food sector is one of the driving forces of the economy of 
the Netherlands and represents an important share of the overall Dutch economy 
in terms of value added. Internationally, the Dutch agro-food sector is also of 
significance. The Netherlands is the world’s second-largest exporter of 
agricultural products and one of the world’s leading producers of vegetables and 
fruit. The downside of this strength is that the Dutch agricultural complex is 
highly dependent on the import of raw materials. For example, the Netherlands 
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imports relatively large volumes of soy beans, which are essential for the 
livestock industry. This import reliance means that the Netherlands is vulnerable 
to supply disruptions. These disruptions may emerge due to failed harvests, 
political instability, or export restrictions. The collapse of imports of important 
raw materials for the Dutch agro-food sector could cause significant damage to 
the overall Dutch economy. Therefore, the Dutch government should promote 
policies that aim to strengthen the resilience of the agro-food system. 
Strategic thinking about the Dutch agro-food sector is also necessary since 
European policy is falling short. For decades, the European Union (EU) has been 
largely self-sufficient in food production thanks to the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). Despite this self-sufficiency, the EU remains vulnerable to internal 
and external shock calamities, such as droughts and other extreme weather 
events, a long-lasting volcano eruption, or epidemics of livestock diseases.2 In 
order to improve European food security, the European Commission is currently 
in the process of reforming the CAP to address some of these risks. However, the 
proposed reforms take little account of the geopolitical risks that threaten the 
supply of raw materials and the production of food and feed in the EU.3 This is 
problematic since geopolitical risks are becoming ever-more important, and 
consequently, so is thinking about the challenges and opportunities they 
represent for the Dutch agro-food sector. 
Background and objective of the report
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs has commissioned this report, written 
by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and the Agricultural 
Economics Research Institute (LEI), with the aim of informing policymakers 
about the geopolitical developments that shape global markets for food, 
agriculture, and raw materials; and the consequences these developments carry 
for the Dutch agro-food sector. The objective of this report is to increase 
awareness of the fact that critical sectors of the Dutch agricultural complex are 
dependent on imported raw materials from the rest of the world and are 
consequently vulnerable to supply disruptions resulting from geopolitical 
developments. Finally, the report aims to contribute to a debate on what policy 
options are available to strengthen the resilience of the Dutch agro-food system. 
Existing research looks into how the Netherlands can mitigate vulnerabilities  
of the European food system, for example by addressing gaps regarding food 
security in the CAP reform proposal. 4 The scope of this report is at the same time  
both broader and narrower in focus. Broader in the sense that it looks beyond 
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food security and also considers the Dutch agro-food sector as an economic 
interest of strategic importance. Narrower because the report has a national 
focus and explores one specific policy option for the Dutch government, namely 
using the strengths of the Dutch agro-food sector to mitigate risks to the supply 
of critical raw material imports.
Research questions and structure of the report
The main research question of the report is:
What are the critical dependencies for the Dutch agricultural complex and how could  
the Dutch government deal with these considering the emerging geopolitics of food? 
The scope of the analysis is limited to the risks related to the dependence of the 
Dutch agricultural complex on imports of raw materials and the opportunities 
for the Dutch agro-food sector to be instrumental in securing resources that are 
of economic interest to the Netherlands. 
To answer the first part of the research question, Chapter 1 describes the relation 
between food, raw materials and geopolitics. This section of the report asks the 
following subquestions:
What developments are shaping the international context in which countries •	
need to secure food and raw materials? 
What policy measures do countries take in light of these developments and to •	
what effect? 
What challenges do these developments raise for the Netherlands? •	
Next, Chapter 2 looks into the risks for the Dutch agro-food sector in relation to 
dependencies on imports of raw materials. The following subquestions are 
posed:
Which sectors of the Dutch agricultural complex are of strategic interest to the •	
Dutch economy?
What raw materials do these sectors need to import in order to remain strong •	
and competitive?
What are the economic, environmental, and political risks to the security of •	
supply of these raw materials? 
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Chapter 3 provides an assessment of the bargaining power of the Netherlands in 
securing access to raw materials that are essential for the Dutch agro-food sector. 
The corresponding subquestions are: 
What strengths does the Dutch agricultural complex have to offer to other •	
countries?
What are the opportunities for forging strategic relations with countries that •	
possess essential resources for the Dutch agro-food sector? 
Finally, Chapter 4 concludes with perspectives on action for the Dutch 
government. It offers policy recommendations on how the Netherlands should 
deal with the international developments relating to food and its import 
dependencies. This section responds to the following subquestions:
Gi•	 ven the emerging geopolitics of food, should the Dutch government employ 
its agro-food sector more strategically? 
Is it possible to use critical interdependencies between the Netherlands and •	
other countries to create win-win situations?
What concrete measures should the Dutch government implement in order  •	
to mitigate risks to the security of supply of raw materials for the agro-food 
sector; and should fostering greater strategic interdependency be a component 
of this strategy? 
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1  The geopolitics of food, 
agriculture and raw 
materials 
This chapter describes the emerging geopolitics of food, agriculture and raw 
materials. This chapter first discusses today’s global challenge of achieving  
food security (1.1). Next, the chapter analyzes in what respects the current food 
crisis differs from historical food crises. Section 1.2 describes the changing inter-
national context in which countries need to secure food and raw materials. Then, 
an overview is given of policy measures countries have taken in response  to the 
food crisis (1.3). Finally, it assesses what challenges these developments raise for 
the Netherlands (1.4).
1.1 The global challenge of food security 
Food scarcity and hunger are a problem for large parts of the world. According to 
the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) most recent estimate, 925 million 
people were undernourished in 2010.5 People in many countries are suffering 
from food shortages and (chronic) undernourishment, including in Mali, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Zambia, Bangladesh, Mozambique, Yemen, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Somalia, North Korea, Niger, and Zimbabwe.6 Hunger  
in these parts of the world is often a result of corruption, conflict, or margin-
alization, rather than an issue of absolute food scarcity.7 Weak governance and  
dysfunctional institutions are at the root of the state’s inability to deliver food 
security.8
The dire food situation in the developing world contrasts sharply with the food 
situation in developed world and emerging economies, which is characterized by 
massive food surpluses and obesity epidemics.9 Nonetheless, food security is also 
increasingly becoming a strategic policy priority of governments in developed 
and emerging economies. This is due to confluent structural factors that are 
driving up food demand, hampering food supply, and heightening food prices.
18
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Growing demand and limited supply 
First, the world population is set to reach over 9 billion by 2050.10 The greatest 
share of this increase will take place in developing countries, in a setting of 
urbanization and robust income growth from economic development.11 
Population growth and urbanization are expected to result in 3 billion more 
urban dwellers by 2050. For most people living in cities, food will have to be 
brought in from remote food-production centers. Higher incomes will change 
diets and consumption patterns. As more and more people enter the middle 
class, demand for meat and dairy products will increase. However, animal 
products such as meat and dairy require more resources to be produced and 
cause higher emissions than plant-based alternatives.12 Growing demand for 
meat diverts cereal stocks toward meat production; 7 to 10kg of cereals are 
required to produce 1kg of meat.13 Globally, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD)-FAO Outlook of 2012 estimates that the 
world will have 2.3 billion additional mouths to feed by 2050. This rise in demand 
will require 60% more animal feed, 1 billion more tonnes of cereals, and 200 
million more tonnes of meat.14 
Second, food availability has come under increasing pressure due to competing 
demands from the non-food sector, mainly for the production of biofuel and 
animal feed. For instance, global demand for vegetable oils for non-food 
industrial purposes has tripled within 20 years. Demand from China and the 
European Union (EU) accounted for 40% of this increase.15 The pressure from the 
biofuel sector is lessening somewhat as the continuation of mandatory blending 
of fossil fuels with biofuels is being debated in the EU and United States (US).16 
The discovery of shale gas and increased production from difficult-to-access oil 
deposits in the US may also temper the demand for biofuel. Although cereal 
availability is not a pressing issue yet, it is significant that between 2008 and 2011 
cereal production for non-food purposes grew by 5.8% whereas cereal production 
for food purposes grew by only 2.5%. In 2010–2011 as much as 54% of total cereal 
production was used for purposes other than food.17 
Several factors are hampering growth at the supply side. In developing countries, 
the agricultural sector has suffered from a persistent lack of investments for two 
decades. Underinvestment has resulted in a lack of proper food storage capacity, 
degraded roads, insufficient technical training and increased transportation 
costs.18 This has made it difficult for local farmers to bring their products to the 
market in reliable and affordable ways. Productivity growth in developing 
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countries may have been negatively affected by the declining share of overseas 
development assistance dedicated to agriculture, which dropped from 19% in 
1980 to 5% in 2010. In industrialized countries agricultural productivity growth 
has reached a ceiling. 19 In addition, supply has been affected by rising prices of 
energy and fertilizer that have put some farmers out of business.20 In the coming 
years, climate change may act as a stress multiplier on the supply side, as 
increasing extreme weather events may negatively affect crops, livestock and 
fishery systems. Climate change may also reduce the availability of land for 
farming due to rising sea levels or the deterioration of land quality.21 The 
availability of farmland is already decreasing due to residential and industrial 
development, urbanization and population growth.
Price developments
The market fundamentals of unbalanced supply and demand have created fertile 
ground for excessively high food prices. The Food Price Index of the FAO shows 
that world food prices have gone from an all-time low in 2002 to record highs in 
2008 and 2011 (see Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 FAO FOOD PRICE INDEx 1990-2012
(SOURCE: FAO)
Policy measures that countries are taking in response to high food prices (see 
section 1.3) at times contribute to market distortions that hike up prices further 
and increase price volatility.22 Agricultural prices vary due to variability in 
production and consumption patterns. Variability in production is primarily 
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caused by variations in area planted or weather events that cause yield variations. 
Consumption patterns change mainly because of changes in income, prices, and 
changing tastes and food preferences. Unpredictable variability in production 
and consumption transmit into price volatility. Additional factors, such as 
stockpiling and supply and demand shocks of other commodities, may also 
amplify or attenuate volatility.23 
Some commentators assert that the increase in volatility also arises from 
financial firms that are increasingly investing in agricultural commodities 
through futures contracts and other financial instruments. Although this has 
received much attention in policy forums, such as the FAO and the Group of 
Twenty (G20), academic research is not conclusive on whether there is a 
relationship between price volatility and the activity of financial institutions. 
Meijering et al., for example, conclude that there is no evidence that speculation 
on agricultural futures markets has resulted in more volatile food prices on a 
weekly or monthly basis.24
The impact of price volatility depends on whether a country is a net importer or 
exporter of food and on how well it is integrated in world markets.25 Advanced 
economies are usually most open to price shocks but spend only a small 
proportion of their national income on food. The least-developed economies are 
disproportionately affected, as they are often net importers of food products, 
either in raw or processed form, and spend up to 70% of their budgets on food.26 
Moreover, farmers in the developing world often lack insurance or savings, 
which would enable them to handle large income fluctuations caused by price 
volatility.27 
Security implications
Against this backdrop, food security is an issue which is increasingly dealt with 
in the realm of geopolitics. Indicative of this development is the recent discourse 
surrounding the spikes of food prices, which emphasizes the security risks of 
food scarcity. The security implications of food insecurity became fully apparent 
during the 2008 food crisis and more recently during the Arab Spring. In January 
2011, record high food prices resulted in protests in Tunisia, in which over 100 
people died and which subsequently led to the spread of revolutions in other 
North African and Middle Eastern countries. Commentators have since depicted 
food scarcity as the “hidden driver of world politics”.28
HCSS Report 21
THE GEOPOLIT ICS  OF FOOD,  AGRICULTURE AND RAW MATERIALS
Although some commentators in the media write about the possibility of 
countries going to war over food29, there is no historical evidence of interstate 
conflict over food. This does not mean, however, that the threat of instability 
should be downplayed. On the contrary, incidents of violence related to food 
scarcity are numerous. According to the US State Department, more than 60 
food-related riots have happened worldwide as a result of higher food prices and 
food insecurity.30 Cases such as Liberia in 1980, the September 2010 riots in 
Mozambique, and the Arab Spring tell us that the risks of instability are real  
and serious.31 The ongoing conflict in Darfur is also an example of how food 
insecurity can contribute to conflict and large migration flows. The situation  
in this western part of Sudan is partially caused by climate change, as settled 
African farmers and nomadic Arab tribes fight over failing land and dwindling 
supplies of water. If prices continue to rise and food becomes increasingly scarce, 
food is likely to become an ever-more important diver of regional instability, and 
consequently international politics, in the future.
Another phenomenon causing international tensions is land grabbing, which  
is the acquisition of agricultural land by foreign investors. High food prices have 
triggered an increase of large scale acquisitions of farmland, especially in Africa, 
Latin America, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Governments of emerging and 
developed economies have started to proactively purchase or lease thousands of 
hectares of farmland in foreign countries as an alternative to buying food on  
the international food market. Target countries usually welcome this interest,  
as it brings foreign investment, technology, know-how, and infrastructure.  
Land deals, however, can also create instability and other security risks when 
compromising the local population’s access to resources, alienating local people 
who depend on those resources for livelihood and food security, and putting local 
farmers out of business. 32
1.2 The changing international playing field
Concerns about food security are not a new phenomenon. In the early 1970s, for 
example, prices of rice, wheat, maize, and soy beans also skyrocketed. Although 
current and past food crises share some characteristics the world today is 
fundamentally different from the past. To start with, the scale and speed with 
which changes ripple through the world system have radically changed in the age 
of globalization. Food insecurity today is often the result of a complex confluence 
of factors that may mutually reinforce each other, thus amplifying the scope and 
intricacy of the problem.33 Also, the international system is in transition as a 
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result of two major trends: the transition to a multipolar world; and state 
capitalist tendencies. 
Transition toward a multipolar world
The international system is in transition toward a multipolar world order.34 
Whereas the international economic and political order was for the better part  
of the 20th century dominated by the triad of powers — US, Europe and Japan, of 
which the US was by far the strongest — their power is now in decline as 
economic and political power is shifting towards multiple emerging power 
centers. 35 This power shift has especially strengthened the position of the BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and to a lesser extent South Africa).36 The 
economic and financial crisis has been an accelerator of this power shift from 
West to East and the transition to a multipolar world. The crisis hit the developed 
countries hardest, resulting in the depreciation of the dollar and euro; a decline 
in GDP growth; mounting government debt; depleted national reserves; and, in 
case of the EU, highlighted economic and political divisions that threaten the 
continuation of the monetary union itself.37 The fiscal austerity measures that 
Western countries are forced to take challenge their international commitments 
and leverage. The effect of the financial crisis on the growth of emerging 
economies was much less profound. Their economic power has encouraged  
the emerging economies to also bolster their political influence.38 The BRICS 
countries, but also other emerging economies like Turkey, are increasingly 
challenging the Western-dominated international order. Multipolarity increases 
uncertainty, instability, and complexity in international relations and 
consequently augments the chances of international friction. This is especially 
true in security matters, where the declining willingness or capacity of the US  
to act as the global security provider may increase instability in Asia and the 
Middle East. 39 Such an international order increases the likelihood of supply 
disruptions due to protectionist policies or because countries use food and raw 
materials as strategic instruments.40 
State capitalist tendencies
In addition, in some respects the international system is increasingly departing 
from a market order dominated by neoliberal capitalism and is in transition to a 
world order in which state-capitalist tendencies are more prominent. 41 Especially 
in emerging economies, like China, India and Brazil, the state is, through (semi)
state-owned companies, increasingly playing an important role in the support, 
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ownership, and management of businesses and strategic industries. The 
phenomenon of resource nationalism, previously primarily known from the  
oil and gas sector, is now also observed in the agricultural and mineral sector. 
Resource nationalism refers to a situation in which control over natural resources 
shifts from foreign to domestic state-owned companies. It also means govern-
ments align their policies, including those related to food, agriculture and raw 
materials, more explicitly with the national interest. This development has 
resulted in increased access restrictions, trade barriers, export quotas, and other 
manifestations of growing protectionism. Government support for the 
agricultural sector has been widespread in Europe for years, for example through 
the CAP, but it is also growing developing and emerging economies. Already in 
its 11th 5-year plan, China has made increasing government support to agriculture 
and to farmers a key policy priority in order to achieve food security.42 
It should be noted that historically the role of the state in the resource sector  
has been varying over time, depending on the reigning economic regime and 
conjuncture. In that sense, state intervention in the agricultural and mineral 
sector is not a new phenomenon. Time will tell whether the state capitalist 
tendencies that can be observed today will eventually result in a broader shift 
from a neoliberal capitalist regime to a state-capitalist regime. The final outcome 
of the transition process remains uncertain. For now however, increasingly 
powerful state-owned companies, strengthened national control over natural 
resources, and national policies aimed at securing supplies of food, agricultural 
commodities and raw materials are shaping the international playing field and 
the geopolitics of food. 
1.3 Policy responses 
The global challenge of food security has been addressed by international 
organizations, such as the FAO, the United Nations (UN) World Food Program, 
the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), and the World 
Bank. Their efforts focus on improving the world food situation through 
redistribution, investment, food aid, and many other activities. National 
governments, by contrast, are focused on the more narrow interest of improving 
their domestic food situation. The policy measures that countries are 
implementing to this end are in turn affecting food and raw materials markets. 
See also Annex 1 on protectionist measures.
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Producers, exporters and importers
The policy responses of national governments are to a large degree dependent 
upon whether the country is a producer of agricultural commodities and 
whether it is a netexporter or importer. Looking at the supply side of agricultural 
commodities, a number of countries stand out as ‘prime deliverers’ around the 
world. China is the world’s largest wheat producer, followed by India and the US. 
France, Australia and Ukraine are the largest producers of barley. China and India 
are responsible for the bulk of global rice production; and the US, Brazil and 
Argentina hold most of the market for soy beans. The US is also the world’s 
leading corn producer.43 On the demand side, China and Japan are major 
importers of soy beans. The Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Iran are major 
importers of rice; and wheat is chiefly imported by Egypt, Italy and Brazil. Barley 
is predominantly imported by Saudi Arabia, China and the Netherlands.44
It should be noted that larger countries are often important producing countries 
but not always important exporters. As a result of strong domestic demand, 
some producers maintain large stocks and export only a small share of their total 
production. In the most extreme cases, they are net importers. As a consequence, 
the markets for important commodities, such as rice, soy and wheat, are thin. 
(meaning that volumes traded are low) Of all rice production only 5% is traded  
in international market; the remainder is consumed domestically. By contrast, 
some small countries, such as the Netherlands, export large volumes to the 
international market. 
Balancing domestic needs with export revenues 
As a result of the global food security challenge, governments in producer 
countries increasingly view their agricultural sector through a political-strategic 
lens and play an increasingly proactive role in this sector.45 The agricultural 
sector is considered a strategic asset by “prime deliverers” for the reasons that  
it both satisfies domestic demand for food, and maximizes state revenues by 
exporting food to the global market. In order to do so, a common practice among 
producing countries is to implement production quotas or export restrictions.  
This may, however, decrease the availability of food on the global market and 
contribute to food shortages elsewhere. For example, persistent drought and 
forest fires caused an almost 40% reduction in the Russian grain harvest in 2010. 
In response the Russian government enacted export restrictions on grain, which 
caused Russian grain exports to grind to a halt and resulted in shortages on the 
international market.
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Securitization of food policy
Heightened awareness about global food security challenges has prompted many 
import-dependent countries to develop policies aimed at securing a stable and 
affordable food supply and at mitigating supply disruption risks. These policies 
have included acquiring access to food from overseas through proactively 
purchasing or leasing agricultural land abroad, or through vertical integration of 
companies in the food supply chain. For example, over the past few years, China 
has been purchasing and leasing large areas of agricultural land in some of 
Africa’s poorest countries.46 Import-dependent countries have also implemented 
policies designed to reduce their dependence by improving efficiency and 
reducing food waste.47
1.4 Challenges for the Netherlands
Overall, this chapter has made clear that food security in the 21st century has 
become a topic firmly on the policy agenda of governments worldwide. The 
aforementioned trends and developments also raise a number of challenges  
for the Netherlands, which is endowed with a strong agro-food sector. 
High food prices and food shortages are first of all problematic from a 
humanitarian point of view. They make it difficult for the international 
community to fulfill the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of eradicating 
extreme poverty and hunger, to which the Netherlands is also committed.48  
But food scarcity is also indirectly a threat to Dutch economic interests and  
the Dutch agro-food sector. According to the Global Hunger Index49 the hunger 
situation in 20 countries is alarming, including in India and other countries  
that are key to stability in troubled regions (for example, Yemen, Eritrea, and 
Sudan). Some countries are sourcing regions of the Dutch agro-food sector,  
such as Ethiopia and India. As stated above, food insecurity in these countries 
can lead to political instability and threaten the supply of food and raw materials 
to the Netherlands.
Furthermore, the various policy measures that countries take with the aim of 
securing their economic activities related to agriculture and food can also 
negatively affect global food security. Export restrictions, overseas acquisitions, 
stockpiling, the promotion of vertical integration, and forms of protectionism 
inhibit the functioning of the global food market; can reduce the availability of 
food on international markets; and heighten international tensions, especially in 
a context of multipolarity. As a consequence these policy measures may threaten 
the supply security of the Netherlands. 
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2  Risks assessment of the 
Dutch agro-food sector 
This chapter analyzes the risks to the production potential of the Dutch agro-
food sector in light of its dependency on imported raw materials and minerals. 
The chapter consists of three sections. Section 2.1 analyzes the economic interest 
of the Dutch agro-food sector. It provides an overview of the contribution of the 
sector to the Dutch economy and trade balance, and identifies the clusters of 
substantial strength. We follow the definition of the “agricultural complex”, i.e., 
all activities related to agriculture and food including the processing, supply,  
and distribution of raw agricultural materials. Section 2.2 sheds light on the 
vulnerability of the Dutch agro-food sector by looking at the importance of 
commodity imports for the Dutch agricultural complex. Finally, section 2.3 
identifies a number of risks to the operation of Dutch agribusiness that relate  
to the dependency on critical imports of agricultural commodities and raw 
materials from non-EU regions.
2.1 Economic interest of the Dutch agricultural complex
The Dutch agro-food sector is of strategic importance for the Netherlands.  
From a strategic point of view it can be argued that it is important to maintain a 
domestic food production capacity in order to ensure food security. In that case, 
it is worthwhile to consider sustaining a diverse range of agro-food industries. 
The economic importance of the agro-food sector for the Netherlands can also be 
quantified. The Netherlands is the world’s second-largest exporter of agricultural 
products and one of the world’s leading producers of vegetables and fruit. In 2011, 
the total value of Dutch agricultural exports amounted to nearly €73 billion. 
Ornamental products, meat and dairy products are the top 3 export products 
traded with other EU countries. For trade with non-EU countries, the top 3 
consists of dairy products, cereal products (including starch) and drinks.
The agro-food sector adds value to the economy and provides employment. In 
2010, the agricultural complex corresponded to approximately 10% of the total 
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added value and national employment in the Netherlands (see Table 1). 50  
Roughly half of these activities (4.9% of GDP) are, to a greater or lesser extent, 
directly related to agriculture and horticulture, including the related input and 
processing industries. The other half of the agricultural complex comprises a 
range of activities based on imported raw materials, and also agricultural and 
agro-based services including horticulturists and forestry. 
(EUR billion)  (% of GDP)
 2001 2010 2001 2010
(preliminary) (preliminary)
Activities based on foreign agricultural raw materials (1) 15.3 22.4 3.8 4.3
Pasture-based livestock farming (2) 6.1 7.2 1.5 1.4
Glass-horticulture (3) 4.7 5.6 1.2 1.1
Arable farming (4) 4.0 5.4 1.0 1.0
Intensive livestock farming (5) 5.1 5.4 1.3 1.0
Forestry, horticulturists and agricultural services (6) 3.8 4.3 1.0 0.8
Arable horticulture (7) 1.7 2.2 0.4 0.4
Total agro-food cluster 40.6 52.5 10.2 10.0
p.m. Agrocomplex based on domestic agricultural  
raw materials
21.5 25.8 5.4 4.9
TABEL 1: GROSS VALUE ADDED OF THE DUTCH AGRICULTURAL COMPLEx, 2001 AND 2010 (RANk)
(SOURCE: BERkHOUT AND ROzA, 2012)
Agro-food clusters of substantial strength
The agriculture and food clusters are linked in several ways. As a result, the 
statistical presentation in subclusters is necessarily arbitrary, and a ranking of 
subclusters to identify star performers is equally difficult. Keeping this caveat in 
mind, the three clusters with the highest value added are identified as the most 
relevant clusters for this chapter. These are imported materials, dairy farming 
and glass horticulture; a set that covers approximately 60% of agricultural GDP.
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1 The value creation from internationally acquired raw materials for use other 
than in Dutch agriculture (i.e. as inputs to the Dutch food industry or for 
export) contributes to 4.3% of GDP. Within the agricultural complex based on 
international raw materials, the largest contribution in terms of value added 
comes from the processing of materials by the food industry (€9 billion), 
followed by the supply of inputs and services (€8.2 billion), and finally 
marketing and distribution (€5.2 billion). Key clusters in the processing 
industry include fat and oil, and liquor and tobacco.
2 Pasture-based livestock farming, which is dominated by the dairy cluster, 
contributes 1.4% to GDP (€7.2 billion) and 14% to the added value of the 
agricultural complex. A small share of the cluster consists of cattle farming. 
This cluster holds strong linkages to intensive livestock farming (10.2% of 
agricultural GDP) through the input markets. As both sectors source imported 
feedstock from the feed industry, dairy farming contributes feed and calves to 
the veal cluster, and so on.
3 The glass-horticulture complex contributes 1.1% to GDP (€5.6 billion). In this 
cluster, the bulk of end products proceed directly to consumer markets 
without further processing. As a result, primary production dominates the 
glass-horticulture cluster, indicated by a contribution of just under 60% of 
value added. Supply follows at 35%. The share of processing and distribution  
is limited. 
2.2 Critical imports of agricultural commodities and raw  
materials from non-EU regions
Critical imports are defined as agricultural commodities and raw materials  
with a high value added per unit of imports for which few sourcing options  
exist within the EU. 
In terms of macronutrients (carbohydrates, protein), micronutrients (zinc, iron, 
vitamins), and soil nutrients (i.e. fertilizer components), there are only a limited 
number of regions in the world that produce the bulk of the world’s food, feed 
and mineral supply. The uncertainties with respect to the securing of Dutch 
critical imports for the future are to a large extent linked to the developments  
in these regions.
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As much as 4.3% of the Dutch economy is directly related to the supply, 
processing, and marketing of agricultural raw materials imported by the food 
and feed industry. In addition, the feed suppliers to the dairy and intensive 
livestock farming clusters depend strongly on agricultural and mineral imports, 
as over 95% of the agricultural raw material for the feed-  and grain-processing 
industry is sourced through imports.51 
The value of products imported by the Dutch agricultural sector grew to €48.3 
billion in 2011.52 For trade within the EU, the most important traded products are 
meat, dairy, cereals, seeds, pulses, and potatoes. For trade with non-EU countries, 
fruit, nuts, and spices are ranked highest, followed by coffee, tea, cacao, and 
margarine, fats, and oils. Feed imports consist of a flexible range of bulk goods  
to deliver the appropriate protein, fat and fibre content. Finally, soy beans are 
among the largest feed stocks that are imported.
In terms of non-factor input, crop nutrients like nitrogen, phosphorus and 
potassium are important to consider. The Netherlands is a large producer of all 
kinds of fertilizers, based either on nitrogen, potash or phosphorus (‘single 
fertilizers’) or on a combination of nutrients. The Netherlands depends entirely 
on the import of potash, as no potash mines exist within the Netherlands.  
The world’s largest reserves of potash are located in Canada and Russia. For 
phosphorus, the Netherlands is a net importer as well. Within the EU, only 
Finland possesses large reserves of phosphorus. Recovering phosphorus is a 
possible way for the Netherlands to lessen its import dependency, but this is a 
costly procedure.
2.3 Risks to Dutch agribusiness that relate to import dependency 
This section explores the possible risks to the Dutch agribusiness sector along 
three risk vectors: economic, environmental and political, risks. The appropriate 
definition of risks relates to a likely scenario that importers in Dutch 
agribusiness are unable to source (or secure physical access to through 
derivatives) raw material for critical imports through open markets, commodity 
exchange, or business-to-business contracts. As a major simplification, these 
risks will be discussed as separate categories, although in many cases the 
ramifications across these various dimensions will amplify risk levels.
HCSS Report 31
RISkS ASSESSMENT OF THE DUTCH AGRO-FOOD SECTOR 
Economic risk 
Economic risk relates to excessive price increases in the market beyond the 
management capabilities of the importer, for example using hedging 
instruments. At its most extreme, price levels will prohibit trade. Following  
this line of reasoning, there are two relevant dimensions of economic risk in 
relation to the price formation of commodity imports into the Dutch agro-food 
sector. The first is the extent to which market concentration gives way to supplier 
(oligopoly) or buyer power (monopsony) in setting prices and the negotiation of 
deals. The second dimension is the extent to which importers in the Netherlands 
have sourcing options within the EU market, as this provides important  
fall-back options. Table 2 provides indications of the geopolitical profile of  
five commodity groups, largely based on in-house expert judgement. The 
commodities listed are important raw materials for the top 3 clusters identified 
above, which are imported from non-EU regions. 
Several strands of economic risk can be distinguished. The first types of risk  
are price rises over time as a result of demand growth outpacing productivity 
growth or extraction rates. This is the key pricing mechanism that determines 
prices for land-intensive crops and finite minerals. As outlook studies show,  
such price increases are not hypothetical. Moreover, agricultural markets are 
known to be fragile in general, as the differences between shortage and surplus 
are small and can quickly change, creating severe price swings. A specific subset 
of these risks relates to strong competition for resources, which drives farm-gate 
(or mine-gate) prices up. In addition, grain traders and mineral producers have 
some leverage to influence global prices in the short term through stockpiling. 
The trade in agricultural commodities and minerals (for example, grains and soy 
beans) is dominated by a handful of trading companies. In the case of minerals, 
trade is concentrated in the hands of only a few producer countries. Again, the 
bargaining power of Dutch producers is limited because of the relatively small 
volumes of imports.
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CommoDity 
GRoUP
EConomiC 
siGnifiCanCE
DimEnsions of EConomiC Risk in 
RElation to PRiCE foRmation*
CURREnt toP 5 
soURCinG 
CoUntRiEs of 
Raw matERial #
imPoRt volUmE/ 
valUE aDDED PER 
Unit of imPoRts*
Global maRkEt 
ConCEntRation
soURCinG oPtions 
in thE EURoPEan 
Union
Fruit, nuts 
and spices 
High / high Competitive, 
integrated supply 
chains
Limited (for specific 
tropical fruit and 
spices) to fair/good 
as most fruit, nuts 
and spices have 
good substitutes 
that grow in the EU 
Fruits and nuts: 
South Africa
Chile
Brazil
United States
Costa Rica
Spices:
Vietnam
Indonesia
China
India
Brazil
Coffee, tea 
and cocoa 
High / high Few producer 
regions, strong 
market 
concentration
None (tropical 
commodity)
Cocoa:^
Côte d’Ivoire
Ghana
Cameroon
Nigeria
Dominican Republic
Margarine, 
fats and oils 
(incl. palm oil)
High / fair Several producer 
regions, land use 
constraints
Fair (substitute 
vegetable oil crops)
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Papua New Guinea
United States
Nitrogen, 
phosphorus 
and 
potassium
High / high Few producer 
regions, strong 
market 
concentration
None for 
phosphorus, 
limited for other
Israel
Russian Federation
Norway
United States
Tunisia
Coarse grains 
and soy bean 
for animal 
feed 
Fair / fair Strong market 
concentration, 
land use 
constraints, GM 
regulations create 
segmented 
markets 
EU supply 
insufficient to 
meet EU demand
Soy bean, incl. oil 
cakes: 
Brazil
United States
Australia
Paraguay
Argentina
Grains:
Ukraine
Brazil
Argentina
Thailand
United States
#  2011 Import values (cif prices) from non-EU regions, source : UN COMTRADE data.
^   The top 5 countries for coffee (not roasted) are Brazil, Vietnam, Honduras, Peru, Costa Rica,  
and for tea Sri Lanka, China, India, United States, Argentina
TABLE 2: GEOPOLITICAL PROFILE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
(* SOURCE: PRELIMINARY ExPERT jUDGEMENT BY LEI )
HCSS Report 33
RISkS ASSESSMENT OF THE DUTCH AGRO-FOOD SECTOR 
Second, Dutch agribusiness will suffer as a result of price fluctuations which 
exceed the ‘normal’ level, rendering company instruments to address market 
fluctuations such as hedging obsolete. In international agribusiness, there is a 
wide body of evidence on vertical integration, i.e., the reduction of the number  
of operators in a supply chain. Classical examples refer to the integration of 
fertilizer and plant protection chemicals with the production of propagation 
material, which was driven by a control of supplier power and desire to reduce 
R&D expenditures. The fertilizer industry features a limited number of 
transnational corporations. There is also anecdotal evidence on integration  
with the aim of reducing risk and increasing stability in a volatile market 
environment. Recent research on price evolution and price transmission 
indicates that input and output prices can diverge and/or respond to each other 
in a lagged way. This creates cycles in profitability, in particular in agricultural 
subsectors characterized by small margins, thus disturbing investment and 
innovation patterns. 
A particular risk represents the asynchronous approval of tolerances for low-level 
presence of genetically modified (GM) organisms, particularly in feed stocks 
such as soy bean and corn. The EU is lagging behind other major soy bean  
and corn importers such as China in the approval of minimal traces of GM 
contaminations in import consignments. There is a risk that the sourcing of 
grains for food and feed use in the EU becomes constrained when the markets for 
EU-approved feed stocks will become tight.53 In particular, this risk is amplified 
as Argentina, Brazil, and other producer regions switch massively to GM varieties 
that are not approved in the EU. Rising feed costs will certainly undermine  
the competitiveness of the cluster around intensive livestock farming in the 
Netherlands, which has been operating on low farm-gate prices and low profit 
margins over many years.
Third, rising energy and/or carbon prices affect the costs of transport and place  
a penalty on cross-border trade over longer distance, thus affecting the sourcing 
options for importers. Trade costs are made up of freight and insurance costs, 
border taxes, customs procedures and licensing (or their time equivalent). At 
present such costs are relatively low. However, when energy prices rise, the 
geographical length of a global supply chain may become a restricting factor. 
Moreover, carbon trading schemes may provide a penalty to sourcing over long 
distances (e.g., food miles). This may affect the competitiveness of parts of the 
Dutch agro-food cluster that add limited value to imported raw material, the feed 
sector in particular.
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Environmental risk 
Depletion and abandonment of agricultural land is one of the environmental 
risks cited in the literature. Another risk is biodiversity loss and ecological 
decline (i.e., the erosion of ecosystem functionality). Because of the inter-
dependence among ecosystems and agriculture, ecological decline can also  
lead to diminishing agricultural productivity. 
Together with drought and desertification, land degradation is increasingly 
considered a global problem, because its extent and impacts are increasingly 
affecting environmental and social vulnerability.54 Land degradation does not 
pose, at least in the short term, such a problem for the supply certainty of soy, 
given that large-scale production of soy beans takes place in countries where land 
is relatively abundant, partly as a result of deforestation (for example, Argentina 
and Brazil). That being said, deforestation can have important socio-economic 
consequences, which in turn have a negative impact on local food security (see 
Annex Chapter 2 case study on soy beans). Land grabbing can contribute and 
accelerate deforestation. 
A third pronounced environmental risk is climate change. Rising temperatures 
and changing precipitation levels associated with climate change may have a 
localized adverse impact on crops, soils livestock and pests. Higher temperatures 
reduce crop yields and encourage the proliferation of weeds, plant diseases, and 
pests.55 According to some estimates, by 2085, climate change could result in  
the loss of 11% of arable land in developing countries. For Africa, this estimate  
is even higher.56Although climate change could lead to gains in yields and 
cultivated area for some crops and regions, the overall impacts on agricultural 
production are projected to be highly negative, with increasing food prices 
intensifying the risk of hunger.57 Vulnerabilities associated with climate change 
include food insecurity and increased poverty.
Other environmental risks cited in the literature are stratospheric ozone 
depletion, acid deposition, deforestation, overuse and pollution of fresh water 
supplies, fishery decline and atmospheric pollution. Most of these risks however 
are not directly related to agriculture, with the exception of overuse and 
pollution of fresh water supplies.
HCSS Report 35
RISkS ASSESSMENT OF THE DUTCH AGRO-FOOD SECTOR 
Political risk
Political risk relates to effects on the security of supply of importing countries  
as a result of decisions taken at the political level of commodity exporting 
countries. Section 1.2 already mentions resource nationalism to describe a 
situation in which governments aim to strengthen national control over natural 
resources and align their natural resource policies more closely with the national 
interest. The prevalence of expropriation and resource nationalism is expected  
to increase and has been identified as a key risk for 2013.58A number of different 
types of political risk, of which the first two can occur as symptoms of resource 
nationalism, can be distinguished. 
First, commodity-exporting countries can decide to restrict the exports of raw 
materials. One way this is done is through the establishment of (high) taxes  
on exported raw materials; a decision which drives up global prices and limits 
supply as a result (see Annex 2, case study on cacao). 
Second, vertical integration in commodity-exporting countries (see also the 
paragraph on economic risk) carries the risk that exports increasingly take  
the form of processed goods, thus limiting the export of raw materials. For 
consuming countries with a heavy presence in the commodity processing 
industry, this means a tightening of raw material supplies (see Annex 2, case 
studies on cacao and soy beans). 
Third, civil conflict can act as a major ‘shock’ to the exports of raw materials. 
Examples include the disruptions in the supply of cacao from Ivory Coast in the 
aftermath of the 2010 presidential elections, the drop in the supply of phosphate 
rock from North Africa after the Arab Spring, and the current halt in phosphate 
rock exports from Syria due to the ongoing civil war (see Annex 2, case study on 
cacao and Annex 3, case study on phosphate). Political instability can also be a 
risk factor for security of demand and hamper the exports of product from the 
Netherlands. For example, one-quarter of seed potatoes from the Netherlands is 
exported to North Africa and the Middle East. Exports to Libya and Syria fell as  
a result of instability.59 
Fourth, a high demand for commodities in large emerging economies can 
prompt a reorientation of trade flows to regions of high demand. This can come  
at the expense of other high-consuming regions such as Europe (see Annex 2, 
case study on soy beans).
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Finally, a high demand for cash crops can cause governments and farmers in 
commodity-producing countries to value the production of these crops over 
traditional agriculture, often diverting land away from (local) food production and 
placing local food supply under pressure (see Annex 2, case study on soy beans). 
Response time to risk factors
From an economic point of view, risk cannot be dealt with isolated from a time 
horizon (see Figure below). The essential issue here is that a well-functioning 
economy allows for adjustment and substitution (the Rs: Reduce, Reuse, Recycle, 
Replace, and Redesign). This point can be illustrated by the difference between the 
short-run and long-run economic damage to the EU’s animal production sectors 
caused by asynchronous approval policies regarding genetically modified protein 
products (including soy) between the EU and its trading partners. Whereas the 
short-run impacts could be detrimental to the EU’s pigs and poultry sectors, the 
longer-run impacts, which were still significant, differed from the short-run ones 
by an order of magnitude (being only 25% of the short-run impacts on prices). 
Factors explaining this differential were the time needed to displace one input for 
another, time needed to develop alternative markets for sourcing and time needed 
to pass on cost increases in the primary meat producing sector to later stages in 
the supply chain and to final consumers. Also taking into account the study of 
Jansen et al., the adjustment time could be derived to be about 4 to 5 years. 60 After 
this time the impact will approximate the long-run impact. Responsive polices to 
risks, bridging the short run and allowing the involved sectors to adjust are very 
important.
FIGURE 2: THE RISk FROM A SHOCk AND THE LENGTH OF RUN
(SOURCE: NOWICkI ET AL, 2010)
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3  Opportunities for the 
Netherlands 
This chapter provides an assessment of the potential bargaining capital of  
the Netherlands and how this may be instrumental in securing access to raw 
materials for the agro-food sector. First, the chapter looks at the particular 
strengths of the Dutch agro-food cluster in the international market (3.1).  
Next, the chapter discusses several options to capitalize on these particular 
strengths in the sourcing regions of critical imports for the Netherlands (3.2). 
3.1 What are the strengths the Dutch agro-food sector has to 
offer? 
Recently, stakeholders in the agro-food cluster were asked to reflect on the 
international orientation of the cluster in preparation of the strategies of the 
Dutch Topsectors.1 Both the topsectors (Horticulture & Propagation Materials 
and Agro-Food) identified expanding the activities outside the European home 
market as a main mission. The Netherlands is already a leading exporter of a wide 
variety of goods and services to the world market. At present, 20% of agro-food 
exports are destined for regions outside the EU, mainly Asia (6% of exports);  
the trade comprises mainly dairy products, beverages, coffee, and tea, as well as 
flowers and other floriculture products. As the agriculture and food markets in 
the emerging economies mature, the potential for expanding the export position 
of the Netherlands grows, especially in the following areas. 
Exporting high-value consumer products and genetic material
The production of bulk agricultural products, such as sugar or milk powder, is  
no longer a key strength of the Dutch agro complex, as decades of rising labour 
1 Agro-food, Horticulture and propagation materials, High Tech, Energy, Logistics, the Creative 
Industry, Life sciences, Chemicals and Water are selected as priority sectors for Dutch 
government. Each topsector has mapped out various opportunities and challenges, and 
presented action plans detailing their ambitions and their approach. See the documentation 
on the website of the topsectoren (http://www.top-sectoren.nl/). 
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costs and strengthening environmental regulations have eroded the Dutch 
competitiveness on these markets. The portfolio of exports toward EU and non-
EU markets has gradually shifted to high-value consumer products and genetic 
material. The export values for seed potatoes, for example, have surpassed those 
for table potatoes, and the same applies for infant formula and milk powder; 
dairy cattle and animal genetic material; tomato sauce; and bulk tomatoes.  
The key to this successful upwards movement in the value chain lies in the 
competitiveness and innovative strength of the primary agricultural sector  
and a strong level of integration with the advanced food processing industry.
Direct investment into emerging food and beverage industries 
Knowledge and innovation, embodied in higher-value agro-food products,  
are increasingly being considered in themselves as export products for the 
Netherlands for which there is a large untapped potential on international 
markets.61 This implies a shift from the export of agricultural products to the 
export of agricultural services and inputs; and a greater orientation towards 
foreign direct investment in emerging agricultural markets. Already for some 
time, the Rabobank has been signalling the rising importance of partnerships 
between Dutch companies and firms in the region. 62 These partnerships often 
relate to supply-chain integration and particularly involve the food and beverage 
industry. The Dutch food and beverage industry has dramatically increased its 
stock of foreign direct investment outside the EU, US and Japan. Compared to the 
decade before the financial crisis (2000–2009), the volume of FDI stock of food 
and beverage industry has more than doubled, from €6.0 billion FDI in between 
2000 and 2009 to €14.9 billion in 2010-2011.63 In the early 2000s, according to the 
most recent data from the Nederlandsche Bank, the bulk (55–70%) of FDI stock 
was located in South and Central America. 
Developing sustainable and efficient supply chains for the urban consumer 
The topsectors Horticulture & Propagation Materials and Agro-food identify as 
their main strength in the international market their ability to upgrade current 
agricultural and horticultural systems toward efficient, integrated food clusters 
that can serve the expanding cities in the emerging markets.64 With the growing 
concentrations of wealth and population in middle-income countries, urban 
markets for fresh products are maturing. Inputs and expertise from the 
Netherlands can be instrumental in the advancement of local agricultural supply 
chains for dairy, vegetables and other high-value products. For example, the 
strategy document by Horticulture & Propagation Materials identifies new 
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market prospects for Dutch suppliers (engineering, plant material, propagation 
material, greenhousing), trade companies and services in the field of education 
and training, (cultivation) advice, consultancy, logistics, etc. Similar 
opportunities are identified by the Agro-food sector.
Moreover, both these topsectors have articulated their ambition to move into 
partnerships with local entities to support the upgrading of existing food supply 
systems toward greater productivity and efficiency in resource use. The Agro-
food topsector offers a partnership on “customized system solutions” for solving 
problems of sustainable food production and supply. These system solutions 
“consist of a combined package of products, knowledge, technology and services 
that fit local needs and conditions. They thus contain all the elements necessary 
to produce the products needed including the development of the associated 
supply chains.” As such, expertise on financial services and retailer expertise in  
logistics and marketing could be combined with the hardware to set up a dairy 
processing plant to help deliver an integrated agricultural cluster on a model as 
efficient and innovative as the Netherlands.
In sum, the key bargaining capital of the Netherlands is its agricultural 
knowledge that runs across the board of the three areas identified above.  
The Dutch strength lies in its (self-acclaimed) role as champion in the 
development of sustainable and efficient production systems, notably around 
urban concentrations where the demand for fresh, high-value foods is most 
prominent. Both topsectors focus heavily on the emerging markets. The 
intention is to target, in addition to the BRIC countries, several growth countries 
nearby (Turkey) and further away (Indonesia, Vietnam, Kenya) where middle 
classes are firmly established. In addition, there is the intention to expand 
activities in developing countries that receive official development assistance 
from the Netherlands, albeit largely on a pre-competitive basis.
3.2 Opportunities to use Dutch strengths in mitigating supply 
risks 
What potential economic leverage does the strengths of the Dutch agro-food 
sector offer in the sourcing regions for critical imports of agricultural raw 
material? This section provides a quick scan, with examples on the products and 
markets that were identified as essential for the Dutch agro-food sector. In 
chapter 2 we identified three groups of commodities and related sourcing 
regions, where the Netherlands may wish to secure its access to locally produced 
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commodities or minerals. These three regions and resources will require 
different types of strategies in positioning Dutch strengths to secure Dutch 
interests. 
Contributing to food security and value chain integration in cacao 
producing countries
For many tropical commodities such as cacao, tea, spices and palm oil, the Dutch 
industry is fully dependent on producers elsewhere in the world. This section 
looks at the opportunities for cooperation with countries from which the 
Netherlands sources most of its cacao, namely Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ghana  
and Nigeria. In the tropical, low-income regions where cocoa beans are grown 
and harvested, population growth and the desire to improve the food security 
generate a demand for Dutch knowledge and expertise on how to sustainably 
increase productivity and to add value to the harvested crops through better 
integration in global value chains. Increases in agricultural productivity in this 
region will require the use of high-value input and farming systems and the 
upgrading of agricultural logistics in order to reduce of post-harvest losses.  
The propagation of material and operational expertise in supply chains of the 
Netherlands can be considered as strategic assets in addressing this challenge. 
The added value of Dutch knowledge and expertise in this area is demonstrated 
by, for example, the presence of Royal Ahold in Ghana. For several years,  
the Netherlands-based global retailer corporation Ahold has integrated 
sustainability in the daily operations of the growers of fruit and vegetables. 
Another example is the Dutch involvement in cocoa production, in particular 
through supply chain integration programs, such as the African Cocoa Initiative 
(see Annex to Chapter 3). 
An additional opportunity for the Dutch agro-food sector is to create synergies 
between cash-crop production and food security in these regions. As populations 
expand, national governments are under pressure to improve food self-
sufficiency without compromising income and foreign exchange revenues from 
the cash-crop sector. Being involved in improving the food security of domestic 
populations could enhance the level of cooperation with the national government 
in the cocoa-producing regions and, consequently, may help to safeguard the 
economic interests of the Dutch agro-food cluster. 
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Scientific partnerships with major soy bean producers
The competitiveness of intensive livestock farming in the Netherlands is 
critically dependent upon low-priced feed input. As an example, the case of  
soy beans has been examined, which are heavily sourced from US, Brazil and 
Argentina. The soy bean sectors in US, Brazil and Argentina are generally 
integrated in advanced primary production and processing clusters, supported 
by a well-functioning agricultural knowledge and innovation system. 
Presumably, the main opportunity for cooperation lies in fostering scientific 
partnerships focused on advancing the efficiency, productivity and sustainability 
of production. In Brazil and Argentina, there has been a stated interest in the 
Dutch operational and logistical models for agro-food supply chains, particularly 
in connection with a knowledge agenda and capacity development. Taking a 
broader perspective on productivity improvement, the Netherlands, and the  
EU at large, possess a location and knowledge advantage vis-à-vis the African 
continent. Where previously the Dutch “triple D” approach to the military 
mission in Afghanistan was heralded by the US, in future the “golden triangle” 
could make headway as a model for agricultural development. Both the US and 
Brazil show interest in establishing a global partnership for improving the 
performance of the global agricultural system, particularly in Africa and Eastern 
Europe — two key regions where large untapped agricultural potential remains. 
This presents an avenue for the Netherlands to strengthen its bargaining position 
in the global resource game.
Supply chain development and water management in phosphate-
producing countries
Fertilizer is a critical input for all arable and glass-house agriculture and 
horticulture activities in the Netherlands. The fertilizer on the Dutch market is 
partly produced from imported raw material, including phosphate rock, and 
partly imported as processed fertilizer. There are very few sourcing regions  
for the major fertilizing minerals. An increasing share of phosphate rock and 
fertilizer is expected to come from Morocco.65 
Opportunities for closer cooperation with Morocco are positive. There are 
substantial trade relations with the country, in particular through value chains 
for fresh vegetables, oranges, melons, and other fruit — which are channelled  
in bulk through the Rotterdam and Schiphol ports towards the EU hinterland. 
Besides our logistic assets, Dutch expertise on fresh fruit and vegetables and 
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supply chain logistics may be equally valuable. There is potentially a large 
interest in Dutch expertise in engineering water management, in order to make 
maximum use of available freshwater resources (increase irrigation, prevent 
salinization, etc). Many water-related investments and infrastructures will also 
contribute to improve the preconditions for agricultural growth. Freshwater 
management and integral waste management represent an opportunity to treat 
water and waste originating from urbanized areas more adequately with the 
potential to improve health and sanitation. Opportunities for strategic 
cooperation with Morocco are discussed in further detail in the Annex to  
Chapter 3. 
In sum, the key opportunities for the Netherlands in sourcing countries of 
critical materials lie in establishing public-private partnerships that are aimed  
at finding system solutions, that offer flexible and sustainable solutions to local 
emerging issues. In addition, the Netherlands has the knowlegde and expertise to 
look at local agro-food challenges from a value-chain approach. In public-private 
partnerships, the Netherlands can offer knowledge on how to reduce costs and 
inefficiencies but also on how to make bigger additions of value. 
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4  Conclusion: perspectives 
for action
Most of the world’s food supply is currently organized in long and complex 
supply chains. Food ingredients travel many miles and pass several stages of 
processing and trading before they arrive on our plate. This has brought an 
impressively differentiated food supply, at ever declining costs, to an increasing 
part of the expanding global population. At the same time, analysts and 
policymakers have raised concern over the robustness of the food system in  
the face of shock. A local harvest failure or regime change can have strong 
repercussions on regional and even global agricultural markets.66 The 
interdependencies and compounded risk of problems in stability, quantity, 
quality and price of the raw agricultural materials supply have been addressed  
at the level of Europe67 and Netherlands.68 Being at the heart of the international 
trading system, the Netherlands is prone to several types of risk.69 A vulnerability 
assessment or risk analysis identifies where the major risks lie and what can be 
done to mitigate the impact of such hazards. This report is a first assessment of 
the need for an encompassing research and policy perspective on the geopolitical 
dimension of supply security for the Netherlands. On this basis we derive several 
policy recommendations. 
4.1 Towards a new perspective on risk mitigation 
Although the Dutch agro-food sector is well integrated in the world market and 
the direct risk of absolute food scarcity in the Netherlands is low, geopolitical 
risks are prevalent and should not be neglected. More awareness is necessary  
that scenarios are not unthinkable under which the Dutch agro-food sector has 
difficulty in adequately sourcing raw material imports, either through open 
markets, commodities exchanges or business-to-business contracts. To create 
this awareness, one of the first things the government could do is to contribute 
to the necessary information for proper risk assessments, for example by doing 
studies that identify risks (and solutions) for specific subsectors of the agro-food 
cluster. This report follows a more general approach and describes different 
economic, environmental and political risks to the supply security of Dutch 
importers. These risks are related and can amplify each other.
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From this perspective, the Dutch government has an important role to play in 
devising strategies that focus on mitigating supply risks. Traditionally, the 
Netherlands has had a strongly normative approach to international cooperation. 
Today’s international playing field, however, also requires a more strategic 
approach. To reconcile the two, the Dutch strategy should go beyond simply 
achieving the largest supply security at the lowest cost. The Netherlands should 
distance itself from resource nationalism and aggressive overseas policies to 
secure food and raw materials, which sometimes hurt the local economy or local 
food security. The Netherlands can set itself apart by avoiding to shift the burden 
of securing the interests of the Dutch agro-food sector on to developing countries 
and by instead focusing on cooperative solutions aimed at creating long-term 
win-win situations that benefit both the Netherlands and the sourcing countries. 
Reciprocity should be at the heart of the Dutch risk-mitigation strategy. 
The urgency of the problem requires that the Dutch government take action at 
several levels simultaneously. The policy recommendations below indicate how 
the Netherlands can mitigate supply risk at various levels of action, such as the 
multilateral, the EU, and national levels. This report argues that actions at taking 
actions at the multilateral level is not contradictory with simultaneously 
pursuing bilateral partnerships.
4.2 Policy recommendations 
Given the policy objectives of the Dutch government to take care of the interests 
of Dutch consumers and producers of agro-food products and to support a safe 
and stable world characterized by fair international relationships, a number of 
policy recommendations can be formulated. 
1  Maintain domestic food production to sustain knowledge and 
innovation base 
 At the EU level, the Dutch government should support reforms of the CAP  
that aim to maintain a resilient, resource-efficient food supply in Europe and 
encourage innovation for sustainable production. First of all, maintaining  
a level of European food self-sufficiency can serve as cushion against 
interruptions of food supply. In some circles concerns exist about food security 
in the EU in the long run.70 Others, however, put forward that there is no reason 
to doubt about the food supply in the EU during the coming decades.71 The 
different perceptions of EU food security are affected by expectations on how 
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the EU agricultural system will respond to global- and policy- related drivers.72 
Uncertainties about these responses reveal the need for a thorough analysis of 
the future development of the EU agricultural system and an assessment on 
whether a revision of the EU food strategy for the future would be necessary. 
 
 What is clear, however, is that maintaining domestic production is also 
necessary to sustain an advanced agricultural knowledge system and to  
remain innovative in the field of agro-food.73 This is especially important since 
knowledge and innovation are increasingly a source of export revenue and lie 
at the basis of the competitive position of the Netherlands abroad. In recent 
years, Dutch exports have shifted away from bulk agricultural products to 
high-value consumer products, agricultural services and inputs, and foreign 
direct investment in emerging agricultural markets. The Dutch government 
should support the maintenance of domestic production and innovation so 
that the Netherlands can benefit from its competitive advantage in providing 
high-value consumer products, genetic material and efficient and productive 
food-supply systems. There is an additional geopolitical motive to sustain an 
advanced agricultural knowledge system: there is tremendous value in having 
a platform for a strong Dutch involvement in unlocking underutilized 
agricultural potential in the world. 
2 Focus on top sourcing countries of critical raw materials and explore new 
sourcing opportunities
The Dutch government should focus on extending partnership with the key 
countries from which the Dutch agro-food sector imports critical materials. 
Critical materials are defined as agricultural commodities and raw materials with 
a high value added per unit of imports and for which few sourcing options exist 
within the EU. The critical materials for the Dutch agro-food sector can be 
divided into five groups: 1) fruit, nuts and spices; 2) coffee, tea and cocoa; 3) 
margarine, fats and oils; 4) nitrogen, potassium and phosphate; and 5) coarse 
grains, soy protein and other feedstock. Table 2 in chapter 2 identifies the top-5 
sourcing countries for each group of critical materials. Of the total of 26 
countries on the list, some countries, see table 3 below, are a top supplier for 
more than one resource and are therefore of special importance to the Dutch 
agro-food sector.
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CoUntRiEs fRUit, nUts 
anD sPiCEs
CoffEE, tEa 
anD CoCoa
maRGaRinE, 
fats anD 
oils
nitRoGEn, 
PotassiUm anD 
PhosPhatE 
CoaRsE 
GRains anD 
soy PRotEin
brazil X X
indonesia X X
nigeria X X
United states X X X X
TABLE 3: COUNTRIES FROM WHICH THE NETHERLANDS IMPORTS MORE THAN ONE GROUP OF 
CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS
 In addition to focussing on key sourcing countries, the Dutch government 
should explore the opportunities for the Dutch agro-food sector to find 
alternative suppliers. To this end, the Dutch government could publish sector-
specific market-outlook analyses. The current geographical sourcing pattern is 
the result of both prevailing market dynamics and a gradual development of 
transnational supply chain relations over the past decades. In looking for new 
alternative suppliers, it may be interesting to look through a ‘climate lens’.  
The current list of top sourcing countries for the Netherlands can be grouped 
into two different climate zones; the temperate climate zone and the tropical 
climate zone. The Netherlands imports fruit, vegetables and minerals from 
both zones. Soy beans come particularly from the moderate climate zone and 
coffee, cacao, tea and palm oil from the tropical climate zone. It is worth 
exploring whether there are alternative regions closer to Europe with similar 
climatic conditions for the production of these agricultural commodities,  
such as the Black Sea region.74 
3 Reinvent multilateral cooperation and move beyond promoting open 
markets
 The Dutch government should continue the existing policy of promoting  
open and stable markets in international forums such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the OECD, but it should also aim to reinvent 
multilateral cooperation on food, agriculture and raw materials. The current 
multilateral framework, especially for trade, does not adequately serve the 
grand challenges that face society, nor the interests of the Dutch agro-food 
sector. 
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 One example of why the existing WTO disciplines are unfit for the present 
landscape is that WTO legislation tilts towards the favor of resource-owners 
and export countries. Although quantitative restrictions are banned under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 rules, notable exceptions 
have made it relatively easy for countries to implement export restrictions.  
For example, Article XI paragraph 2(a) states that the prohibition on export 
restrictions does not extend to “restrictions temporarily applied to prevent  
or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the 
exporting contracting party.” Key terms such as “temporarily” and “critical 
shortages” are not well defined.75 Lenience on export restrictions ignores the 
rights of importing countries. The Netherlands should push for a critical 
review of trade legislation, an imposed limitation on the use of export 
restrictions, and more transparency in markets, where necessary in 
combination with adequate stockholding provisions.
 
 The development of a new multilateral framework that brings together 
suppliers and importing countries to find cooperative solutions for the 
growing nexus of food, agriculture and raw materials would be ideal. Such  
a coalition is unlikely to develop swiftly given the prevailing international 
conditions. The dynamics explained in chapter 1 make it inprobable that 
producing countries would be willing to participate in a framework that  
could potentially limit their freedom of action and undermine their interests. 
A regional approach aimed at bringing together the importing countries is 
more likely to be successful. 
 The Dutch government should explore opportunities to increase multilateral 
cooperation between importing countries. One of the objectives of this 
multilateral cooperation should be to promote transparency on available 
supplies of raw materials and factors that may contribute to demand and 
supply shocks. In addition, cooperation should focus on improving resource 
efficiency and some form of governance on sustainable resource management. 
Solutions to the challenges of climate change, failing research & innovation 
systems, and diet transitions need to come from global cooperative effort.76 A 
recent Chatham House publication report calls, in this regard, for a coalition 
of 30 of the most substantive importers, exporters and producers to embark on 
a dialogue on global resource use.77 Various initiatives that contribute in this 
direction can be supported financially and politically. The Netherlands should 
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support and can build on existing multilateral mechanisms and regulations, 
such as the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) of the 
World Bank, the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, 
the Montpellier panel, etc. 
4 Complement multilateral efforts with strategic partnerships 
 The efforts at the multilateral level described above should be complemented 
with efforts to develop strategic partnerships with countries where both the 
Dutch agro-food complex has valuable knowledge to offer and from which  
the Netherlands imports critical materials. These partnerships can be forged  
at the EU level or bilaterally, depending on existing agreements and the 
opportunities for new partnerships. The partnerships should revolve around 
innovation for sustainable production in the agro-food sector and be based  
on reciprocity, i.e., by creating long-term win-win situations for both the 
Netherlands and the sourcing country. 
 An example of such win-win cooperation could be to help West African 
countries, such as Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Nigeria, to improve  
local food security by providing the necessary knowledge about increasing 
agricultural productivity. In return for a stable and secure supply of cocoa, the 
Netherlands can offer high-value input and knowledge to improve farming 
systems and to upgrade the agricultural logistics and reduce post-harvest 
losses. Another opportunity lies in scientific partnerships with Argentina and 
Brazil where the Netherlands contributes knowledge on how to advance the 
efficiency, productivity and sustainability of the soy bean production in return 
for security of supply of soy beans. To secure the supply of fertilizers, the 
Netherlands could forge strategic partnerships with important producers of 
nitrogen, potassium, phosphate rock and processed fertilizer. As a growing 
share of phosphate will come from Morocco in the future, the Netherlands 
could strengthen cooperation with beyond existing trade, which exist 
primarily of fruit and vegetables. In return for supplies of phosphate rock  
and fertilizer, the Netherlands can offer Morocco much-needed knowledge on 
fresh- and waste-water management, and integral waste management.78
5 Adopt a strategic perspective on sustainability 
 Sustainability is and should remain a key component of strategic cooperation 
in agriculture and raw materials. However, the Dutch government should 
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move beyond environmental motives to encourage sustainability and adopt a 
strategic vision on sustainability as means to mitigate supply disruption risks 
for the agro-food sector. This means first of all that the Netherlands should 
invest—and encourage the Dutch agro-food sector to invest—in resource 
efficiency and sustainable supply chains to avoid rapid resource depletion  
and to create long-term supply security. In addition, the Netherlands should 
use its good reputation on sustainability to gain access to resources and 
markets abroad. With IDH, the sustainable trade initiative, the Netherlands 
has gained international visibility when it comes to shared value creation 
through the implementation of sustainable trade solutions. A commitment  
to sustainable production and balanced supply-chain relations is also an 
insurance policy against allegations of being merely after a countries 
resources. Offering countries knowledge for sustainable production and 
supply chains should be an integral part of the win-win cooperation between 
the Netherlands and sourcing countries. Finally, the Netherlands should use 
sustainability as a trigger to involve the private sector in public-private 
partnerships that serve the interests of the Dutch agro-food sector. The 
Netherlands largely supports the efforts to develop certification schemes for 
agricultural commodities, such as sustainable soy and palm oil, and raw 
materials, such as tin. Whether through these Round Tables and certifications 
or other governance mechanisms, the Netherlands should aim to continue 
involvement in the global governance of sustainable raw materials production. 
 
6 Start strategic dialogue with the agro-food sector 
 The Dutch government should engage the private sector in a dialogue about 
strategies to mitigate threats to the agro-food sector. This dialogue should 
initially focus on two issues but could be expanded. First, the Dutch 
government and the agro-food sector should devise strategies to shorten the 
response time of industry in case of supply disruptions. Economic damage 
resulting from supply disruptions will be more significant in the short run 
than in the long run, because in the long run industry will respond to the 
changed market conditions with adjustment policies (see section 2.3). 
However, implementing adjustment strategies costs time. Developing 
alternative markets for sourcing, finding substitutes, and passing on cost 
increases to later stages in the supply chain and final consumers does not 
happen overnight. Government support should focus on supporting the 
industry to shorten the response time in order to limit short term economic 
damage. 
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 Second, the Dutch government and the agro-food sector should think about 
ways to improve the resilience of the industry. Ways of improving the 
resilience of the sector may include strategies which are preventive and  
which do not necessarily conform to market logic.For example, instead of 
cooperating with suppliers that offer the lowest market price, the Netherlands 
could seek suppliers that may be more expensive but offer supply guarantees. 
This example illustrates that the government and the agro-food sector should 
think together about potential trade-offs they are willing to make in achieving 
security of supply. Another preventive solution is to explore alternative 
sourcing regions and alternative crops and raw materials. 
7 Integrate ago-food interests in economic diplomacy 
 Finally, the Dutch government should integrate the agro-food interest of the 
Netherlands into a comprehensive economic diplomacy strategy, which should 
be an integral part of Dutch foreign policy and development cooperation.  
To that effect, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs should promote an 
interdepartmental and cross-sectoral dialogue with other ministries, in 
particular with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Infrastructure and the 
Environment. Part of this strategic reorientation constitutes a shift away from 
idealistic motives behind international cooperation toward an emphasis on 
investment for mutual benefit. 
 
 It also means that a more systematic approach should be developed to identify 
which countries should be designated for international cooperation. The 
critical interdependencies in the area of food and agriculture should be 
integrated into this approach. This can be done by identifying per sector the 
top sourcing countries for critical imports. At the moment, the policy of the 
Dutch government focuses heavily on the emerging markets, several growth 
countries with an established middle class, and countries that receive official 
development assistance from the Dutch government. There are valid reasons  
to do so, but Dutch diplomacy should also serve the interest of the Dutch  
agro-food sector and target top sourcing countries that are currently not on 
the radar. 
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Protectionist Measures79
Of all cereal production worldwide, only 10% is traded internationally.80 Precisely 
because these commodity markets are ‘thin’ world prices respond strongly  
to relatively small changes in both policy and quantities traded.81 Whereas 
consumers spend around 40–70% of their budget on basic food, governments 
often aim to keep their domestic cereal markets stable and will respond to 
international price changes with measures to stabilize markets.82 Thus, when 
international food prices climbed steeply in 2007–2008, many countries reacted 
with trade measures to keep domestic prices low and to prevent exporters from 
selling on international markets. A survey on policy responses by 61 developing 
countries to the 2007-2008 price hike found that 25 countries implemented 
export restrictions to reduce food inflation in their domestic market and 43 
countries reduced import tariffs to reduce their food import bill.83 Argentina, 
Russia and India were among the major exporters that have curtailed their 
exports. Major importers that have reduced or eliminated food tariffs or taxes 
include Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. In general, 
such policy decisions incur a high fiscal cost and are seen to limit agricultural 
investments into an expansion of supply.84 
According to estimates made by the World Bank, the introduction of trade 
restrictive measures on food accounted for one-quarter of all new trade 
restrictions imposed since the 2007-08 food-crisis.85 As a result, trade policies 
appear as an important explanatory factor of the price peaks.86 As stated by 
Headey: “we find that trade events potentially provide an explanation for how a 
tightening of the world food situation rapidly turned into a full-blown crisis.”87 
The trade policies that followed the rise in rice prices in 2007–2008 are illustrative 
of this point (see Figure 3). Around the 2007–2008 price hike, there was an 
intense policy change aimed at either the curtailment of rice exports, or the 
reduction of import barriers. What proved particularly instrumental in 
normalizing markets was the decision by the government of Japan in early June 
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2008 to sell 300,000 tonnes of its surplus ‘WTO’ rice stocks to the Philippines.  
As a result, the price bubble in rice burst and world prices started to fall 
immediately thereafter.88 
More recent literature on the food price crisis has identified that ad hoc trade 
measures are among the major causes underlying the overshooting of prices 
beyond their equilibrium point (this is true of rice prices in particular).89 Trade 
policies added additional instability to the actions of millions of farmers (often 
small-scale) and traders, who in reaction to rising prices started hoarding, thus 
raising domestic prices even further.
FIGURE 3: TRADE MEASURES IN THE RICE MARkET AROUND THE 2008 PRICE PEAk
(SOURCE: HEADY, 2011)
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Cacao
The Netherlands is one of the biggest importers of cacao beans worldwide—the 
basic ingredient required to make cocoa, a dark brown powder made from cacao 
beans, used to make chocolate and add a chocolate flavor to food and drinks. 
Around 20% of the global trade in cacao is conducted in Amsterdam, making it 
the world’s biggest ‘cacao port’. The Netherlands plays, alongside the US, also an 
important role in the processing of cacao beans, with around 13% of the global 
cacao processing industry located in the Netherlands.90 In total, the sector 
employs over 7,000 people and has an annual turnover of €2.2 billion. 91 A 
possible shortfall in the supply of cacao could thus carry serious consequences 
for the Dutch cacao processing industry. A study undertaken by CE Delft in 2011 
estimates that a 50% cut in the supply of cacao to the Netherlands could cause 
prices for chocolate products to increase by around 40%, causing potentially  
€2 billion worth of economic damage.92
A limited number of suppliers
As mentioned in Table 1, the global market for cacao is heavily concentrated. 
Over 70% of the market is in the hands of just four countries: Cameroon, Ivory 
Coast, Ghana and Nigeria. The biggest share of the market is controlled by Ivory 
Coast (around 35%).93 Almost the entirety of Dutch imports (98%) comes directly 
from these countries, with Ivory Coast accounting for 32% of total imports, 
followed by Cameroon (24%), Nigeria (17%) and Ghana (15%).94
Rising prices and signs of vertical integration
Figure 4 depicts the price development of cacao since 1990. Global prices have 
been steadily rising, particularly in recent years, inter alia, as a result of strong 
economic growth in the emerging economies, where a growing level of affluence 
has created a higher demand for chocolate products.95
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FIGURE 4: WORLD CACAO PRICES, US$ PER kG 
(BASED ON WORLDBANk DATA)
Although high prices mean higher costs of imported beans for the Dutch cacao 
processing industry, a potentially more worrisome development is a trend of 
increased vertical integration in cacao-producing countries. For example,  
due a newly added domestic processing capacity, Ivory Coast became the  
second-largest cacao processing country, with about 400,000 tonnes of cacao 
processed in 2009–2010, just behind the Netherlands (470,000 tonnes) and 
surpassing both the US (382,000 tonnes) and Germany (361,000 tonnes).96 Some 
sources claim that Ivory Coast is bent on increasing its cacao processing capacity 
to 50% of its annual crop in 2012, and up to 100% in the near future.97 Such a 
development would make it increasingly harder for the Dutch cacao processing 
industry to acquire sufficient raw material from Ivory Coast. 
Export restrictions and civil conflict
The drive toward vertical integration, however, is not the only worrisome 
development. Increasingly, African producers have taxed or charged their 
exports of cacao, which in turn drives up the price and limits supply. Ghana 
levies taxes on the export of cacao; Cameroon’s export is subject to various fees; 
and Nigeria applies an administrative charge of US$5 per ton of exported cacao.98 
Ivory Coast, however, represents the most striking example of state intervention. 
During the civil conflict that ravaged Ivory Coast from 2002 to 2007, several 
agricultural subsectors were affected. However, as the conflict was felt more 
strongly in some parts of the country than in others, the effects differed. Crops 
such as cotton and maize which are grown in the North, the area held by the rebel 
fighters, have been most severely affected. Cacao and coffee, which are grown in 
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the rain forests of the South, remained steady despite the conflict.99 Nonetheless, 
the effects of the civil war on cacao have been seen in the resumption of export 
taxes and increased trader margins.100 
Civil conflict has been a recurring factor in Ivorian politics and the most 
consistent factor dictating policy and performance in Ivorian agriculture.101  
The risk of instability remains high to this day. Indeed, HCSS calculations 
indicate Ivory Coast suffers from endemic corruption; an ineffective and  
weak government and rule of law; a lack of strong and reliable private sector 
regulations; and a limited possibility for the population to voice their grievances 
and hold governmental action to account.102 The persistent risks this situation 
carries to the cacao sector – and the Dutch cocoa processing industry in 
particular – were exemplified by the 2010 presidential elections, when former 
president Laurent Gbagbo refused to acknowledge his electoral defeat and 
occupied the presidential palace for several months thereafter. In response, the 
internationally recognized winner of the elections, Alassane Outtara, banned all 
cacao and coffee exports in order to choke off funding to his rival. Global prices 
for cacao soared as a result.103 
Soy
Measured over 2010–2011, the EU was the second biggest importer of soy beans  
in the world, just after China.104 Within the EU, the Netherlands is responsible  
for just over 28% of the total amount of soy beans imported.105 The total import 
value was more than €1,14 billion.106 This is partly due to the strategic position  
of the Netherlands as a transit port; but also because of the Dutch agricultural 
sector’s strong focus on the production of animal proteins, which requires large 
quantities of soy as feedstuff.107 About one third of the imported beans are 
exported, mainly to Germany and Belgium. The rest is crushed to extract the oil, 
which is (after further refinement) then partly exported to other EU countries.108 
The total added value of the consumption of soy as forage is estimated at €778 
million, which corresponds to roughly 0.2% of total GDP.109 The total amount of 
jobs in the different branches of the food industry, the production of animal feed 
and oil seeds in particular, is estimated at 8,800.110 Illustrative of the dependence 
of the Dutch economy on a small number of suppliers is the fact that if half of the 
soy beans imported to the Netherlands were no longer available, and therefore 
would have to be replaced by alternatives, the total economic damage would 
amount to €1,4 billion.111 
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Strong market concentration
Figure 5 shows that the US, Brazil and Argentina combined, are responsible for 
more than 80% of the world’s soy production.112 Of these three, the US holds the 
largest share of the world market at just over 34%.113 The Netherlands imports its 
soy beans mainly from Brazil and to a lesser extent from the US. Imports from 
Argentina have been negligible in recent years.114
FIGURE 5: WORLD SOY PRODUCTION 2010-2011
(BASED ON WORLD BANk DATA)
To ensure trade would remain (largely) free, the European Community (EC)  
and the US negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding on Oilseeds (commonly 
referred to as the ‘Blair House Agreement’) during the 1992 GATT Uruguay 
Round.115 
Increased demand from emerging economies
However, as mentioned above, Dutch imports come mainly from Brazil and to  
a lesser extent from the US. A worrisome development in this regard is that due 
to sharply rising Chinese soy bean imports (a key importer of Latin American  
soy beans), the demand for soy beans from this part of the world is set to grow 
strongly. Indeed, some analysts expect China to increase its imports of soy beans 
by as much as 43% in 2020.116 The United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) goes even further than this by suggesting that Chinese soy bean imports 
will rise to 59% by 2021–2022 and will account for over 80% of the projected 
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growth in global soy bean imports.117 Production levels will have to increase in 
order to meet demand. Since US production growth is limited because of land 
constraints, this enormous increase in production will have to be borne chiefly 
by Argentina and Brazil.118 With most of the Argentine exports already going to 
China119, this additional demand will increase competition over Brazilian soy 
beans. This development is of particular concern to the Netherlands, as Brazil  
is its primary export source for soy beans. 120
Implications of required production increase
Given the expected increase in soy production required to meet future demand,  
a number of issues should be taken into account. First of all, the global soy bean 
market is shaped and controlled by a relatively small number of international 
business conglomerates.121 The few players are: American-owned Archer Daniels 
Midland (ADM), Bunge and Cargill; and French owned Dreyfuss. Popularly 
referred to as the ABCD companies due to their names, these companies not only 
provide the fertilizer for the soy, but also dominate the processing industry that 
divides the beans into oil for food manufacturing and protein meal for animal 
feed.122 For example, in the last decade Cargill, ADM and Bunge are thought to 
have acquired about 80% of China's soya processing capacity.123 Such a high level 
of market concentration means that these companies can potentially act as price-
setters on the global soy market and limit the possibilities for imports from 
alternative sources.
Second, increasing the production of soy carries big socio-economic 
implications, which may increase the risk of social instability. In order to enable 
production to grow, Latin American soy farmers are in desperate need for more 
agricultural ground. This quest to acquire more land, however, often leads to 
violent clashes with local communities and tribes over land rights.124 Because 
customary land rights of local communities are often not, or only partially, 
recognized and governmental capacities to regulate the registering of land 
ownership are weak, public (forested) land is often occupied without obtaining 
the required official land titles.125 Moreover, the expansion of soy production 
often directly (through forest conversion) or indirectly (through the opening  
of forests) contributes to forest degradation and further deforestation.126 The 
decreasing availability of non-timber forest resources has a negative impact  
on local incomes and food security; and on indigenous communities, who for 
their livelihoods often depend on the availability of wildlife, fish, wild fruits, 
jungle rubber and other non-timber products.127
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Third, with a high expected demand for soy in the future, it is financially 
attractive to grow the crop. As a consequence, soy is increasingly grown on fields 
that were otherwise used to produce food for local markets, thus placing local 
food supply under pressure.128 Moreover, local communities are facing a different 
problem as a result of the increased mechanization of the soy production. 
Mechanized soy production not only requires less labor, but also a different kind 
of labor, thus reducing employment possibilities for local communities. Due to 
the technical expertise required for mechanized soy production, local farmers, 
who are unskilled, lose employment opportunities to higher skilled workers, 
such as agronomists and mechanics.129
Taken together, the above mentioned factors place limitations on the ability of 
Latin American soy farmers to further increase their production beyond a certain 
threshold. In light of the strong projected increase in demand coming from 
China, coupled with the inability of the US to increase its production levels,  
the Netherlands is likely to face higher prices for soy imports in the future. 
Furthermore, there is a greater risk of social instability in the producer regions  
of Latin America. In addition to higher prices, the Netherlands may therefore 
also experience supply disruptions as a result of instability. 
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The Africa Cocoa Initiative
The African Cocoa Initiative—a major collaboration between the World Cocoa 
Foundation, the US Agency for International Development, the government of 
the Netherlands and leading international cocoa buyers—was launched in 
Cameroon in July. The Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) contributes expertise 
and certification. The initiative aims to increase productivity and sustainability 
in the sector by fostering public-private cooperative investments in cocoa and 
agriculture, improving the genetic quality and productivity of the cocoa varieties 
under cultivation, expanding farmer education and training programmes, and 
improving the agriculture input supply chains that serve farmers. The budget for 
the project stands at US$13.8m (CFA7.3m) with plans to leverage at least US$25m 
from the private sector over the duration of the initiative.130
Phosphate
Phosphate rock is the primary source of phosphorus. The bulk of phosphate rock 
is used for global food production. Modern farming methods require the use of 
phosphate in fertilizers, which are used to produce sufficient quantities of food. 
Although the Dutch agricultural sector presently experiences a phosphate 
surplus, the Netherlands does not possess any significant phosphate rock 
resources of its own, and is thus almost entirely dependent on the import of the 
raw material as an input for its phosphate processing industry.131 Indeed, the bulk 
of imported phosphate rock (83%) is processed and re-exported as fertilizers; as 
inorganic chemicals (648,100 tonnes (t) of phosphorus pentoxide, or P2O5); as 
food for human consumption (185,500t P2O5); and to a lesser extent, as animal 
feed and manure (43,500t P2O5). Phosphate, therefore, is a vital resource for the 
Dutch agro-food industry.132
A heavily concentrated market
In 2011, two/thirdsrds of global phosphate production came from China, the  
US and Morocco (including Western Sahara). Exports are dominated by the 
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phosphate-producing nations of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region, who represent 80% of the world’s total exports. The biggest three 
exporters are Morocco (40% of exports), Jordan (23%) and Syria (13%) 
respectively.133
Risks to the Netherlands’ security of phosphate supply
Several developments are potentially worrisome. First, in 2007‒2008, phosphate 
rock prices soared, inter alia, due to a rise in demand for fertilizer, insufficient 
fertilizer production, export restrictions in China, speculation and a heightened 
awareness among producer countries that they could ‘set the price’.134 Continued 
population and economic growth, urbanization, rising prosperity and 
concurrent changes in consumption patterns are likely to cause the newly higher 
prices to remain or rise, but certainly not fall.135 Second, national monopolies are 
widespread and rock producers are becoming increasingly vertically integrated. 
This will cause phosphate imports into the EU to increasingly take the form of 
fertilizer, rather than raw rock136—thus increasing the pressure on the Dutch 
phosphate processing industry. Finally, ongoing geopolitical instability in the 
MENA region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria,  
have caused severe disruptions in the phosphate rock exports to Europe.137 
Perspectives for action
In order for the Netherlands’ security of phosphate supply not to be adversely 
affected by the above mentioned developments, it is crucial that the Dutch 
government adopt an inclusive strategy towards phosphate rock producing 
countries and their (mining and fertilizer) companies. Such a strategy would 
enable close (technical and knowledge) cooperation on key challenges and  
would strengthen the overall sustainability of the phosphate industry.138 
Several key areas in which the Netherlands holds strong expertise, provide 
possibilities for such cooperation. First, freshwater management is a case in 
point. The mining sector relies heavily on the use of water throughout all of its 
stages. Because of competing claims over water coming from the agriculture and 
drinking water sectors, water scarcity is a potentially serious limiting factor for 
the phosphate mining industry.139 
Second, integral waste management represents an opportunity to treat waste 
originating from urbanized areas in the Middle East and North Africa more 
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adequately. Often such systems are lacking, causing environmental damage  
and adversely impacting drinking water quality and human health.140 
Finally, wastewater (a source rich in phosphate) reuse in agriculture is common 
throughout the Middle East and North Africa. However, in most countries of the 
region, wastewater treatment plants are not operated and maintained adequately, 
making wastewater unsuitable for unrestricted irrigation. Low freshwater prices 
also lead to a preference among farmers to rely on freshwater resources, under-
mining wastewater reuse and placing additional stress on already scarce 
freshwater resources.141 
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